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Interbasin Water Transfers:
An Economic Panacea or a Political Ploy?
K. WILLIAM EASTER and NIR BECKER

ABSTRACT-New concern about the open access nature of the Great Lakes was sparked by the 1982 Sporhase
Supreme Court Decision which limited states' power to prevent interbasin water transfers and was intensified
by the 1988 drought in the Midwest. In response to the court decision, the Great Lakes Charter was adopted
which established a set of management rules for new interbasin water transfers and other consumptive water
uses. However, not all Great Lakes states have implemented the Charter provisions and, even if they did, it
is not clear that the Charter objectives could be reached. The big losers from a large interbasin water transfer
would be hydropower and navigation interests. The states most affected would be New York and Michigan,
along with the two Canadian provinces, since they produce and use most of the hydropower on the Great
Lakes. It appears that, given the high costs of large interbasin water transfers, they could not be economically
justified, particularly those designed to provide irrigation water for the southwestern states. Only small water
transfers for urban or industrial uses would have a chance of passing any economic efficiency or political test.

Transferring water over long distances is nothing new for
the United States. Even within the Great Lakes basin, there are
five major water transfers (see Table 1). The ones we hear the
most about are the Chicago diversion out of Lake Michigan
and the Long Lac and Ogaki diversions into Lake Superior.
During the drought in 1988, there were attempts by the
Governor of Illinois to have the Chicago diversion increased
so that transportation would be improved downstream in the
Illinois and lower Mississippi rivers. Similarly, the Governor
of Minnesota attempted to increase the flow of water in the
upper Mississippi by requesting larger water releases from
northern Minnesota lakes in the Mississippi headwaters. In
contrast, during the record-high Great Lakes levels in the
middle 1980s, there were calls to reduce the Long Lac and
Ogaki diversions because they were causing some increase
in already excessive lake levels.
Thus wet periods and droughts both seem to raise the issue
of water transfers. In addition, two 1980 court decisions
intensified the level of concern among Great Lakes states
legislators. "The Supreme Court ruled in Sporhase v.
Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, (1), that groundwater is an article
of commerce and subject to the commerce clause of the U.S.
constitution. As a result, Nebraska could not forbid the
transfer of groundwater across its state line. Upholding and
reinforcing the Sporhase decision, the 1983 El Paso v. New
Mexico decision (2) struck down a New Mexico prohibition
of water exports. Thus any attempt by the Great Lakes states
to legislatively embargo interstate water transfers strictly for
economic reasons will likely be held in conflict with the U.S.
commerce clause (3)."
These court decisions have heightened concerns because
of the growing water problems facing southwestern states and
the continued shift of U.S. population to the sun belt. This
increased population in the Southwest means that their

political power relative to the Great Lakes states will increase.
In addition, since the Great Lakes contains over 90 percent of
the fresh surface water available in the 48 contiguous states,
areas with water deficits look at the lakes as a source of new
water. Thus the Great Lakes states and Canadian provinces are
concerned that, as the political power of the southwestern
states grows, these states will be able to take "their" water.
Now that perceived legal blocks to such bans on water
transfers no longer exist, the concern has reached new levels.
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New Rules for Managing the Great Lakes
In response to new restrictions on the states' ability to use
their policy power, two actions were taken to help eliminate
the possibility of new water transfers. In 1985, the eight
governors and two premiers agreed to coordinate water
quantity management among all Great Lakes states and
provinces by signing the Great Lakes Charter. This was
important because the Sporhase decision requires that any
effort to regulate water withdrawals had to regulate intra- and

Table 1. Water diversions involving the Great Lakes
Diversion
Long Lac and Ogaki
(into Lake Superior)
Lake MichiganChicago River

Quantity Benefits
(cfs)
5,600

Hydro-electric power
and transportation of logs

4,167 Navigation, recreation,
(before water quality, and
1980) hydro-electric power
3,200
(1980 to
Present)
Navigation, water
quality, hydroelectric
power and water supply
Navigation

Average Change
in Lake Levels
Bern
-6 cm

-13 cm

No Change
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interstate diversions in the same manner. States could protect
against unwanted diversions by enacting statewide water
plans that make water preservation an integral part of the plan
( 4). The charter encourages all states and provinces to adopt
water plans that include water preservation as an integral part
of the plan. It also requires that states and provinces provide
prior notice and consult with other states and provinces
before water transfers or new large consumptive uses are
approved. Yet to be effective, the provisions of the charter
must be adopted by each state legislature. Thus far, five of the
eight U.S. Great lakes states and the two Canadian Great lakes
provinces have essentially adopted the charter provisions:
Minnesota, Wisconsin, New York, Illinois, Ohio, Ontario and
Quebec. The other three states have not acted, which is
surprising, particularly for the State of Michigan.
The second action involves U.S. Public Law 99-662which
prohibits any interbasin water diversion from the Great lakes,
unless it is approved by all the governors in the Great lakes
states. The public law essentially prohibits all diversions; in
comparison, the Charter seeks to regulate all water withdrawals out of the Great lakes larger than a specified size. The
public law makes the Charter's non-binding principle of
notification binding for interbasin diversions but not for other
consumptive uses or intrabasin diversions. In addition, the
public law applies only to the U.S., while the Charter applies
to both the U.S. and Canada.
Neither the Charter nor Public Law 99-662 were needed
in the summer of 1988, when attempts were made to increase
the Chicago diversion. The 1967 U.S. Supreme Court limitation of 3,200 cfs on the diversion was enough to stop any
increase. Canadians, as well as some of the U.S. governors,
complained when the possibility of increasing the diversion
was first suggested. Even if the Canadians and all eight Great
lakes states governors had supported the increased diversion,
it is not clear that the increase could have been implemented
due to the Supreme Court limitation.

"The quantity and quality of water available for use at one
location may be affected by water use, waste disposal, or
weather modification practices at another location. It is this
interdependence of water users that gives rise to many water
issues and complicates the 'rules of the game' bywhich water
is managed (5)."
Thus, in general, it is not good water policy to allow the
"market" to determine the question of interstate water
transfers. Of course, that is not to say that the water should
not be priced or that the markets should not play a role in
allocating water. To better understand the economic issues,
let us consider the economic model suggested by Howe and
Easter ( 6). They point out that many proposed water transfers
would involve large investments which are long-lived and
have major impacts on the environment. The long life means
that the water systems will be unable to incorporate future
technological innovations and may involve irreversible
changes ( e.g., the central Arizona project). The Howe-Easter
model involves a two-stage test of the economic feasibility of
water transfers. The first stage requires total benefits derived
from the transfer to exceed the project costs plus any costs
imposed on others by the project.

Economic Considerations

In other words, if there is a cheaper way to provide the water,
then the transfer is not the economically efficient choice.
The direct project benefits (DB) are the direct economic
gains from the project such as improved navigation or
increased irrigation. The secondary project benefits (SB) are
those increases in net incomes from activities related through
the market either as input suppliers for, or processors of,
project outputs. These income increases must be ones which
would not have occurred without the project. On the other
side of the equation are all the losses caused by the projects
such as the loss in the direct and secondary economic
benefits to the exporting states (DCx + SCx). In other words,
what is the value of water uses precluded in the exporting
region by the water transfer? An added cost may also arise in
other regions when the exported water is used to increase
agricultural crop production. This will occur when the U.S.
has surplus agricultural production capacity and the transfer
displaces crop production in other regions or raises federal
commodity program costs (SCc). Finally, the largest cost, in
most cases, will be the cost of building and managing the
project (TC).
Losses in preservation benefits involve two aspects. First,
the demand for preservation benefits is likely to increase
more rapidly than the demand for development benefits from
most diversion projects. Thus preservation benefits (PB) are
multiplied by a factor (1 + a) which accounts for this
difference in demand growth. Second, when there are

From an economic perspective, should the Great lakes
states be interested in trying to trade or sell their water? If
some western state were willing to pay $400/ac · ft of water,
why not sell the water and use the revenues to pay for roads,
schools, and health care? For example, the State of South
Dakota was willing to sell Missouri River water to the ETSI
Pipeline Company for a coal slurry pipeline from Wyoming
to Arkansas. This sale was to occur between two parties and
ignored downstream uses which could have been precluded
by the transfer during periods when water was not in surplus.
In other words, such simple trades are much like private
market transactions which ignore important negative externalities. Only the drop in energy prices and the resulting
abandonment of the coal slurry project stopped the sale.
Water is not like other goods that can be consumed or used
to produce other commodities without having a direct impact
on other individuals. In addition, there are no markets for
Great lakes water that would discourage water consumption
and encourage conservation. The value of water also varies by
location, quality, and time of availability. Excess water in the
spring may actually have a negative value to the Great lakes
during years of high lake levels. Finally, non-consumptive
water use makes it difficult to obtain an appropriate value for
water. The use of runoff, return flows, and seepage water may
make it impossible even for a state to capture the full value
of a given quantity of water.
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DBm+ SBm > DCx + SCx + SCc +TC+ S + PB (1 + a)t
In other words, the increase in net incomes [direct project
benefits (DBm) + secondary project benefits (SBm)] in the
importing states (m) must exceed the loss of income in other
states [direct losses in exporting region (DCx) + secondary
losses in exporting region (SDx) + displacement costs in
other regions (SCc)] plus the project construction and
management costs (TC) and any losses in preservation
benefits (PB) all discounted at the appropriate rate. The
second condition requires that the discount project costs
(TC) be lower than the discounted costs of the next best
alternative (TCa).
TC <TCa

155

irreversibilities and uncertainties regarding the project's
outcome, there is a benefit from delaying development until
more is learned about the possible outcome (7). Thus
Krutilla and Fisher (8) suggest that a shadow tax (S), which
represents. the value of information gained by waiting, be
included in the investment criteria.
If we apply this criterion to the Great lakes, the likely
impacts on the Great lakes will involve: navigation, hydropower, shoreline erosion, recreation, waste disposal capacity,
and domestic and industrial water supplies. The major losers
from a diversion will be navigation and hydropower. For
example, a major diversion of 10,000 cfs would cause lake
levels to drop from 5 to 8 inches and would involve a loss of
about $70 million annually to hydropower and navigation.
Ninety percent of this loss would be due to reduced
hydropower production, and the remainder would be caused
by lighter loads in cargo ships (9). In contrast, the same
diversion could reduce shoreline erosion costs and may have
some impacts on domestic and industrial water supplies and
recreation.
Depending on how the diverted water is used, its value can
range from $10 to$400/ac • ft(lO). Forlargetransfers, the only
feasible uses appear to be irrigation and possibly in a few dry
years, navigation ( the major benefit from increasing the
Chicago diversion in 1988 would have been improved
navigation). If the transfer is for irrigation, then the range in
water values will not exceed $50/ac • ft.
Rough cost estimates put the cost of large water transfers
out of lake Superior just to the Missouri River basin at $200
to $300/ac • ft (11), depending on the discount rate. This, of
course, is much different from the cost of releasing a little
more water out of the Chicago diversion. A new transfer
would involve digging new channels as well as pumping
water out of the Great lakes basin. These costs would rise by
another $200 to $300/ac • ft if the diversion was designed to
deliver water to agricultural areas facing increased water
shortages, such as the high plains of Texas (12). Such
diversion would involve major capital costs, as well as high
power costs required to lift the water to the high plains.
However, the situation may be quite different if we are
talking about small diversions within the Great lakes region.
For example, what if New York wanted to transfer water to
New York City, which is outside the Great lakes basin, or
Illinois wanted to transfer water south for urban water use?
When the transfer is small, the negative impacts on the Great
lakes, DBm and SBm, are likely to be small. In addition, if the
water is for urban use, the benefits will be high and there will
not be any displacement effects in agriculture. Consequently,
the major concern should be the cost of the transfer and the
cost of alternative sources of water. Environmental impacts of
the project will also have to be considered, since even small
transfers might have significant environmental impacts in the
areas where the pipeline or canal is built. The bottom line will
be whether or not the benefits can cover project construction
and management costs as well as environmental costs.

Political and Distributional Concerns
Since water transfers from the Great lakes can have impacts
on eight states and two Canadian provinces, political
considerations may be more important than economic
considerations. The politics is complicated by the fact that the
distribution of benefits and costs of proposed transfers is not
uniform. For example, the major losers in a large water
transfer would be the two Canadian provinces and the states
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of New York and Michigan, since they produce and use most
of the hydropower in the Great lakes. Other states would lose
some from navigation, but this is small relative to the possible
hydropower losses (9).
On the benefits side, those that stand to gain the most
would be the states like Illinois, which have the easiest means
of transferring water. In periods of drought, Illinois can obtain
significant benefits from increasing the Chicago diversion but
the other states would lose. To illustrate, an increase of 5,000
cfs in the Chicago diversion would have a small but significant
impact on Minnesota. The annual losses could reach about
$250 thousand during periods of low lake levels. A similar
diversion out of lake Superior would have a slightly larger
negative impact on Minnesota, but Minnesota could receive
some benefits from using or selling the diverted water.
Because of these distributional impacts, it will be difficult
to get all the Great lakes states and provinces to agree to
support any water transfer, even if it would produce substantial net benefits. In such cases, only the U.S. and Canadian
federal governments might be able to impose an economically efficient solution on the region. Yet the Great lakes
states and provinces seem to fear such an outcome because
they may have to bear most of the costs.
Another possibility would be for the states receiving most
of the benefits from a transfer to share the benefits with other
Great lakes states and provinces. How this could be done is
not clear and would have to be negotiated. It would mean
developing new institutional arrangements within the Great
lakes, possibly through the International Joint Commission.
This might by done by developing a system of transferable
permits that would allow a sharing of benefits as well as allow
water to be allocated to its highest valued uses (3). As
discussed above, five of the states already require water
permits, although their transferability is limited. Such
institutional arrangements could pay high dividends,
particularly in a future with greater water demands.

Conclusion
The Great lakes states and provinces will, in the future, face
increasing pressure to make more efficient use of their water.
This could mean use of Great lakes water in new areas with
growing water demands. How the Great lakes states and
provinces will respond to such pressures is not completely
clear. In the past, their reaction has been to say "no."
However, if new institutional arrangements could be
developed so that the benefits and costs from water transfers
are more evenly shared, this reaction might change. Certainly,
we should not reject, without careful study, the possibility of
raising our standard of living by selling Great lakes water.
This assumes that the Great lakes states and provinces have
the legal rights to sell or trade the Great lakes water, an issue
which is has not yet been resolved.
We should stop worrying about large scale water diversions
that are so uneconomical as to be nonsensical, and concentrate instead on more important issues that are facing the
Great Lakes. Specifically, more emphasis is needed on
managing consumptive water uses within the basin and on
evaluating small water transfers that might be beneficial to the
region.
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